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Ayres: Using Tort Settlements to Cartelize

USING TORT SETTLEMENTS TO CARTELIZE
Ian Ayres*
The tobacco company settlements, with four individual states
(Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi and Texas) and the subsequent multistate agreement of November 1998, represent a legal innovation in
cartelization technology.' These new settlements allow state and local
governments to act as cartel ringmasters - writing enforceable contracts
which will predictably (i) raise the market price toward the monopoly
level, (ii) split the supra-competitive profits with the government, and
(iii) deter new entry. If such settlements are enforceable, states that have
virtually no nexus with a set of industry producers - and in fact have not
been injured by the industry - may nonetheless "race to the bottom" by
suing and settling with an industry in order to enjoy a share of the cartel
profits. Unfortunately, it is far from clear that such settlements currently
run afoul of the law, and this Article accordingly recommends that
federal legislation should prohibit the types of settlement structures that
are most likely to produce cartel-like results.
It has been understood that anticompetitive settlements can be
produced when competitors sue each other in intellectual property or
merger contexts. 2 It has also been understood that captured state
agencies may cartelize in-state producers of a particular product.3 But
the individual state tobacco settlements suggest that a state may
profitably cartelize out-of-state producers. States may settle fallacious'
tort claims to cartelize industries with which the state has no contacts
whatsoever. The Minnesota tobacco settlement, for example, allowed

William K. Townsend Professor, Yale Law School. ian.ayres@yale.edu. This piece is
based on Ian Ayres, Comment, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC AcrVrlY:
MICROECONOMICS 395 (Martin Neil Bailey et a]. eds., 1998), which responded to the
excellent article, Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, The Tobacco Deal, in BROOKINGS PAPERS
ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 323 (Martin Neil Bailey et al. eds., 1998). Bruce
Ackerman, Akhil Amar, and Kenji Yoshino provided helpful comments.
I See generally Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, The Tobacco Deal, in BROOKINGS PAPERS
ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 376-77 (Martin Neil Bailey et al. eds., 1998).
2 Joseph F. Brodley, Antitnst Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling PrivateIncentives
and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1995); J. Stephen Simms, Scope of Action
Against Unfair inport Trade Practices Under Section 337 of the TariffAct of 1930, 4 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 234 (1982). Guido Calabresi long ago saw that tort settlements might serve as a
focal point for firms in coordinating an anti-competitive price increase. See Guido
Calabresi, Sonte Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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out-of-state cigarette manufacturers to coordinate charging higher prices
4
in exchange for reduced legal liability.
This Article focuses on two attributes of the settlements:
(1) damages are contingent on the prospective quantity
of sales; and
(2) damages only accrue above some exempt offset
5
quantity.
The November 1998 multistate agreement contained both aspects.
Defendants agreed to pay damages of $0.35 per pack on prospective
national sales, but for small companies a certain percentage of sales were
exempt.6 Making damages contingent on future quantities sold increases
the manufacturers' marginal cost and therefore can predictably increase
the price toward the monopoly level. Exempting a certain, number of
units produced (the "offset" amount) from the damage calculation can
allow the state to share the cartel profits with the producers.
To see how these two provisions work together to cartelize the price
and split the profits, imagine, for example, that the state of Alaska sues
Archer Daniels Midland and other producers of lysine on the
cockamamie theory that lysine production creates a particular type of
acid rain which has harmed the citizens of Alaska. 7 Before the suit,
lysine is selling at a competitive price of, say, $100 per ton; and, at the
monopoly price of $120 per ton, 100 million tons could be sold.
Immediately following the suit, the parties enter into a settlement
whereby Alaska will be paid damages of $20 per ton on all lysine
4

Bulow &Klemperer, supra note 1, at 373 &n.127.

5

As discussed below, such an "offset" provision was used to limit the production of new

entrants.
6 Bulow &Klemperer, supra note 1, at 376-77.

Lysine producers such as Archer Daniels Midland ("ADM") have already shown a
sharp interest in colluding:
Beginning in 1996, the Antitrust Division prosecuted Archer Daniels
Midland and others for participating in an international cartel
organized to suppress competition for lysine, an important livestock
and poultry feed additive. The cartel had inflated the price of this
important agricultural input by tens of millions of dollars during the
course of the conspiracy. ADM pled guilty and was fined $100 million
- at the time the largest criminal antitrust fine in history.
Prepared Testimony of John M. Nannes Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, Federal
News Service (Apr. 27, 2000).
7
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produced nationally by the industry in any future year in excess of 50
million tons. This hypothetical lysine settlement would likely (a) raise
the price of lysine to the monopoly level; and (b) split the monopoly
profits between the lysine producers and the settling state. If there were
no offset, it would be easy to see that the marginal cost of all lysine
would increase by $20, so one would expect to see the price increase
from $100 (the pre-settlement, competitive price) to $120 (the postsettlement, monopoly price). Now, imagine the effect of a 1%(1 million
ton) offset. One would still expect manufacturers to sell all lysine at $120
per ton, because competition drives price toward the cost of producing
the'last ton of lysine, the marginal cost. If the offset is increased to 50
million tons, one should still expect the price of all lysine to be $120 per
ton. For this price and this offset, Alaska would earn "damages" of $1
billion (50 million x $20) and the lysine producers would earn $1 billion
on the 50 million ton offset or inframarginal units.
But wait, it gets worse. Before agreeing to settle Alaska's fallacious
suit, the lysine producers may wait to see if some other state would be
willing to cartelize their industry for a smaller fee. Nevada may be
willing to sue and grant the producers a 60 million ton offset. The larger
the offset, the larger the proportion of the profits the producers will
retain. In short, a race to the bottom may develop. In the extreme case of
state competition, some state might be willing to cartelize the lysine
producers for a paltry share of the cartel profits (fearing that the
producers move on to settle with another state).8 Thus, one might
imagine Alaska (or a third state, say, Hawaii) countering by offering to
settle for a 90 million ton offset - which would give the producers 90% of
the cartel profits (and exact only a 10% ringleader fee).
Of course, for any state settlement to be effective, it must be true that
new entrants do not compete down the "settled" price. Accordingly,
cartelizing tort settlements are most likely to be effective where there are
independent barriers to entry. But even without such structural barriers
to entry, it is possible to structure the tort settlement itself to dampen the
incentive for unconstrained entry. The November 1998 multistate
agreement shows that states can provide powerful carrots and sticks to
discourage entry. The settlement by its terms applied only to R.J.R.,
Philip Morris, Brown & Williamson, and Lorillard, thus raising the
possibility that new entrants could enter the cigarette market with a

8 It is important to remember that the state's (acid rain) tort claim is, by assumption,
fallacious and could not succeed if the defendants refused to settle.
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$0.35 per pack cost advantage (on a product that only cost $0.20 per pack
to produce).9 To deter such entry, the agreement included a carrot
provision that allowed small producers who voluntarily subject
themselves to the per-pack damages to keep all of the revenues on sales
of up to 125% of 1997 sales. Alternatively, the agreement also mandated
the "stick" that states are encouraged to pass model statutes requiring
new entrants and small companies that do not subject themselves to the
higher prices to make "trust fund" payments to cover the costs and
damages resulting from potential future litigation. 10 The trust fund
payments would equal the same amount per pack as the consensual
damages per pack under the multistate deal, but would not be
deductible. As Bulow and Klemperer note, non-deductibility of the same
nominal amounts means that "a payment of $0.35 a pack would require a
price increase of about $0.55 a pack, putting a nonsignatory at a $0.20
price disadvantage."" Finally, the "trust fund" payments would need to
be made on all packs sold rather than simply those in excess of 125% of
base sales (which would occur if the producer consented to the
aforementioned "carrot"). 12 The agreement was also careful to give the
individual states strong incentives to pass the model legislation and
defend it from constitutional attack. States that did not pass the model
statute risked forfeiting their entire share of the per-pack damages; and
states that passed the law but whose state courts declared it invalid
would lose up to 65% of their cut of the cartel revenues.
If such shenanigans do not violate federal law, we are potentially in
a lot of trouble. Individual states may be tempted to cartelize private
industries under the guise of settling sham litigation. Unfortunately, the
thesis of this Article is that the state cigarette settlements in particular,
and the sham litigation in general, are not clearly illegal. The remainder
of this Article assesses three different reasons why the state settlements and more generally the ploy of basing settlement payments on the
prospective quantities of product sold nationally - might be
unenforceable. For convenience, this Article will refer to these rationales,

9

Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 1, at 377.

'o

Id.

11 Id.

The proposed tobacco resolution of June 20, 1997 contained analogous "sticks" to
encourage the participation of non-settling firms. Id. Non-participating firms would have
been required to escrow as a bond against future legal claims (for 35 years) 150% as much
money as they would have had to pay under the proposed per-pack damages. Id. at 338
n.33.
12
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respectively as the non-legislated taxation, extraterritorial taxation, and
cartelization theories.
I. NON-LEGISLATED TAXATION

While this Article has argued that the tobacco settlements are a cartel
device, the settlements can also be seen as imposing an extraterritorial
tax.13 Viewed as a tax, the settlements might be criticized on the ground
that the taxing power belongs to the legislature - not to the executive,
and certainly not to the industry. This is not, however, the primary
reason to question the legality of the settlements. For one thing, the
power of taxation is a matter of state constitutional law, and a state could
repeal a constitutional restriction (if it currently has one) requiring the
legislature to impose all taxes, or the legislature (or the legislature's
delegate) might be willing to enter into the same type of settlement to
transfer money from other states' citizens to its own fisc.
There is also the important question of whether this settlement
constitutes a tax or a fee. Even though there is some basis at the federal
14
level for thinking that taxes are a matter solely for the legislature,
courts have narrowly defined what constitutes a "tax." It is simply not
the case that all payments to the government are taxes which must grow
out of legislative action. For example, in upholding the FCC's collection
of cable fees, the Supreme Court in 1974 had this to say about the
difference between taxes and fees:
Taxation is a legislative function, and Congress, which is
the sole organ for levying taxes, may act arbitrarily and
disregard benefits bestowed by the Government on a
taxpayer and go solely on ability to pay, based on
property or income. A fee, however, is incident to a
voluntary act, e.g., a request that a public agency permit
an applicant to practice law or medicine or construct a
house or run a broadcast station. The public agency
performing those services normally may exact a fee for a

13

Id.

14 See National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340 (1974) ("Taxation

is a legislative function, and Congress. . . is the sole organ for levying taxes .. ").This
conclusion is based on Article I, Section 8,Clause 1 of the United Stated Constitution,
which grants Congress the "Power to lay and collect Taxes." Id. at 341.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2000

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 3 [2000], Art. 9

600

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
grant which, presumably, bestows a benefit on the
applicant, not shared by other members of society.15

The legislative action requirement for taxation is probably an
attempt to assure a broad-based political check against unwanted taxes,
but a voluntary payment in exchange for a benefit is not a tax because
the consent of the payer substitutes for the political check. Similarly, the
fact that the tobacco companies consented to the state settlements may be
considered by the courts as a substitute for the legislative-political
16
check.

Hl.

EXTRATERRITORIAL TAXATION

A potentially stronger basis for challenging such settlements turns
on the extraterritorial effect of "taxation." In 1881, the Supreme Court
defined the extraterritoriality principle succinctly and unanimously in
Bonaparte v. Tax Court17: "No State can legislate except with reference to
its own jurisdictions."' 8 The more majestic language of Chief Justice
John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland19 is also apposite:
It is admitted that the power of taxing the people and
their property is essential to the very existence of
government, and may be legitimately exercised on the
objects to which it is applicable, to the utmost extent to
which the government may chuse to carry it. The only
security against the abuse of this power, is found in the
structure of the government itself. In imposing a tax the
legislature acts upon its constituents. This is in general a
sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive
taxation.... Would the people of any one State trust
those of another with a power to control the most

Id. at 340-41. The Supreme Court has also upheld judicially imposed taxes to fund
school desegregation remedies. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
16 Of course, if the incidence of the settlement will fall largely on consumers, the question
arises whether the companies' consent is sufficient.
'5

17 104 U.S. 592 (1881).
18 Id. at 594. The Supreme

Court rejected the claim that a state issuing bonds could because of the full faith and credit clause - exempt those bonds from the taxation of other
states where the bondholder lived. Id.
19

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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insignificant operations of their State government?
20
know they would not.

We

The specific prohibition against states taxing activities that occur
outside their jurisdiction is now normally said to be an implicit
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. 21 In
1940, the Supreme Court articulated the basic standard for determining
whether a tax was "extraterritorial," that is, whether it violated the due
process clause:
[The] test is whether property was taken without due
process of law, or, if paraphrase we must, whether the
taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to
protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state.
The simple but controlling question is whether the state
has given anything for which it can ask return. 22
As one scholar has noted:
This rather amorphous standard has been found to have
two components. First, "no tax may be imposed unless
there is some minimal connection between [the activities
generating the income] and the taxing State." Second,
"the income attributed to the State for tax purposes must
be rationally related to 'values connected with the taxing
23
State."'
Under these standards, the settling states would argue that they
have given something in return to the cigarette manufacturers - to wit,
limitations on tort liability. Opponents of the settlement would argue,
however, that the cigarette revenue attributed to the state for tax

Id. at 428, 431.
z This prohibition on extraterritorial taxation actually predates the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Hays v. Pacific Mail Steam-ship Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596,
599-600 (1854). The extraterritoriality principle also at times raises dormant commerce
clause and full faith and credit clause issues. Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (i) CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (ii)
ExtraterritorialState Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1865 (1987). The state cigarette settlements
do not implicate the dormant commerce clause because they do not "favor local businesses
over out-of-state businesses." See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 US. 137 (1970).
22 Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435,444 (1940).
23 Seth Goldstein, Note, "Resident" Taxpayers: Internal Consistency, Due Process, and State
Income Taxation, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 128-29 (1991) (quoting Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair,
437 U.S. 267,272-73 (1978)).
20
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purposes was not rationally related to values connected with the taxing
state. Florida has an interest in its in-state cigarette sales, but basing the
settlement amount on cigarettes manufactured and sold outside the state
is arguably not rationally related to Florida's interest. This argument is
even stronger in this Article's lysine hypothetical, where the state is not
suing to redress any actual harm, but solely to organize an industrial
cartel.
Although it is clearly true that an explicit attempt by the Florida
legislature to impose a $0.02 per pack national excise tax would be
unconstitutional, it is equally true that not every corporate settlement
payment to a state that may have the effect of raising the ultimate price
of the corporation's products is unconstitutional. One can easily
imagine, for example, a scenario where Exxon's payments to the state of
Alaska for the Valdez oil spill could have caused Exxon to increase its
gasoline prices. 24 As an initial matter, the question of extraterritorial
taxation only arises if one characterizes the settlement payments as a tax
(which raises again all of the previous section's concerns about the fee vs.
tax distribution). While these payments have many of the economic
features of taxes, Bulow and Klemperer's own analysis highlights some
crucial differences in legal consequences. For example, the settlement
liability may not survive bankruptcy of the current manufacturers in the
same way that tax liabilities would - some tax liabilities take special
priority and are passed on automatically to subsequent purchasers,
which may not be true for settlement liability. Moreover, the settlements
bind only those manufacturers who consent. 25 As earlier mentioned, this
is not the consent of the out-of-state consumers who have to bear the
primary incidence of the "tax." But even setting aside this shortcoming,
the consent limitation means that Liggett and future entrants would not
be liable to pay the prospective per-pack damages. Competition from

21 Although lump sum payments are often sunk (no pun intended) and do not affect the
marginal prospective cost, one can imagine circumstances where lump sum payments
would increase a corporation's marginal cost of capital and possibly its product price.
Indeed, Peter Cramton and his colleagues have shown that rivals for FCC wireless
communication licenses tried to raise each other's sunk costs, possibly to affect their ability
to compete in the downstream consumer market. Peter Cramton et al., Efficient Relocation of
Spectrn Incumbents, 41 J.L. & ECON. 647 (1998).
25 The Supreme Court has considered whether a corporation's consent by choosing to do
business in a state is sufficient to constitute what otherwise would be an unconstitutional
extraterritorial tax. In Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 34-38
(1910), the Court held that a state had no power to condition the right to do local business
on the payment of an extraterritorial tax. Justice Holmes dissented, arguing that the
company had made a voluntary agreement. Id. at 52.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol34/iss3/9

Ayres: Using Tort Settlements to Cartelize

2000]

USING TORT SE7TLEMENTS

603

non-consenting manufacturers at least might mitigate the extra-territorial
effect. Traditional excise taxes do not allow this competitive reaction
from uncovered firms. Of course, the November 1998 multistate
agreement also shows how states can try to dampen such competitive
reaction by punishing entrants who do not join in the agreement and by
rewarding new entrants that do join in.
If the issue ever reached a competent court, the most compelling
reason why the settlement might be struck down concerns its explicit
attempt to regulate extraterritorial behavior. Exxon's Valdez settlement
may have indirect effects on out-of-state transaction prices, but that
settlement did not explicitly change the marginal out-of-state cost of
transacting in the same way the state cigarette- settlements do. The
Supreme Court in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor
Authority26 showed an antipathy to at least one type of explicit
extraterritoriality
regulation. 27
Brown-Forman concerned
the
constitutionality of New York's "affirmation law," which required
distillers that sold to wholesalers in New York to file monthly price
schedules for their products and to affirm that they would not sell liquor
at a lower price to any wholesaler anywhere else in the country during
this period. Distillers who violated this affirmation could have their
license to sell liquor in New York revoked. The Supreme Court struck
down this explicit attempt to regulate out-of-state prices - even though
the regulation did not discriminate against out-of-state trade and was
not easily characterized as a tax - because of the direct and explicit
nature of the attempt to affect extraterritorial transactions.
Although this extraterritorial due process challenge is the strongest
grounds for attacking the state settlements, grave procedural barriers
may preclude competent litigants from bringing suit before a competent
tribunal. Who has standing to complain about the violation? It is far
from clear that a cigarette smoker would be allowed to intervene to raise
the claim. And even those new entrants that refused to sign the
agreement would not want to challenge it, because the agreement
amongst its rivals would create a pricing umbrella which would allow it
to profitably raise its own price. Furthermore, because state courts are
often thought to join the other branches of state government in
competitive federalism races, we should not put great faith in state
tribunals being able to make disinterested determination of either this

476 U.S. 573 (1986).
27 Id.
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standing question or the underlying substantive issue.28 Yet, it is hard to
conceive how such issues would make their way to a federal court with a
less self-interested incentive to review the claim. It should not be
surprising that no court has to date been presented with this substantive
issue.
Ill. CARTELIZATION

An alternative to the previous "tax" characterization is to attack the
state settlements as an attempt by states to help cartelize the cigarette
industry. Under this interpretation, the state settlements would be seen
as agreements among the cigarette manufacturers and the individual
states whereby the manufacturers would agree to raise prices and give
their increased profits to the state in return for reduced tort liability. Or,
under the more extreme lysine hypothetical, the state would be helping
industries raise prices and split the profits between the manufacturers
and the state (by means of the offset amount).
The problem with this theory is that "state action" is broadly
immunized from Sherman Act antitrust scrutiny. Congress could
prohibit anticompetitive state regulations, but the Supreme Court has
held that Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to restrain even anti
competitive state action.29 Bulow and Klemperer recognized that a "state
action" doctrine would allow a state to enter into a settlement which
would raise the in-state price of cigarettes just as it "allows cities and taxi
owners to fix fares without running foul of the federal antitrust laws," 30
but they do not seem to recognize that this doctrine also allows states to
orchestrate higher prices that predominantly fall on out-of-state
consumers. For example, in the mother of all state action cases, Parkerv.
Brown,31 the Supreme Court refused to strike down a California statute
that created a commission to set prices and restrict output among
California raisin growers. Like the Mississippi tobacco settlement, the
California raisin regulations tend to raise the price on in-state and out-ofstate consumers. The fact that the vast majority of consumers affected by
the statute would be out-of-state does not affect the legality of the state's
action.

Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 365 (1992).
See Parkerv. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943).
M Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 1, at 373 n.128.
31 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
21
29
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Indeed, the prevailing standard for determining whether otherwise
anticompetitive conduct is immune under the state action doctrine is the
two-prong Midcal test which requires that the challenged restraint must
be "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy" and
"actively supervised" by the state. 32 These requirements, however,
would do little to thwart either the cigarette settlements or the more
pernicious lysine race-to-the-bottom. The settlements do more than
merely give the cigarette manufacturers an opportunity to collude: they
"clearly articulate" a mandated payment per pack. 33 The states would
also actively supervise the collusion, for example, by auditing the yearly
collection of the settlement amount.34
The Supreme Court has
emphasized that the active supervision requirement does not imply that
the regulation must take the public interest into account:
Our decisions make clear that the purpose of the active
supervision inquiry is not to determine whether the
State has some normative standard, such as efficiency, in
its regulatory practices. Its purpose is to determine
whether the State has exercised sufficient independent
judgement and control so that the details of the rates or
prices have been established as a product of deliberate
state intervention, not simply by agreement among
private parties. 35
Courts will not inspect the purpose or effect of the regulation, only
whether it is the true byproduct of state action.
The single relevant exception to this broad doctrinal immunity
concerns circumstances when the state itself is a "commercial
participant" who colludes with other industry members. But the

32 California Retail Dealers Ass'n. v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980); see also

Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
-3 This supervision requirement prevents the state from frustrating "the national policy in
favor of competition... by casting a 'gauzy cloak of state involvement' over what is
essentially a private price-fixing agreement." 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 345

(1987).
3 There is some question whether the state policy has to be articulated by a legislature.
See HaUie v. City of Eau Clair, 471 U.S. 34, 43 (1985); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture
Theory of Antitnst Federalism,99 HARV. L,.REV.713 (1986). This raises an antitrust analog to
the earlier issue of nonlegislative taxation. It may be that nonlegislative cartelization may

fall outside of the state action doctrine; however, state legislatures should have ample
incentives to enter into the lysine deal.
m FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 634-35 (1992); see also New England Motor Rate
Bureau, Inc. v. FTC, 908 F.2d 1064,1074 (1st Cir. 1990).
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Supreme Court has recently emphasized that the "commercial
participant" exception does not cover every potential state "conspiracy":
There is no... conspiracy exception. The rationale of
Parker was that, in light of our national commitment to
federalism, the general language of the Sherman Act
should not be interpreted to prohibit anticompetitive
actions by the States in their governmental capacities as
sovereign regulators. [T~his immunity [,however,] does
not necessarily obtain where the State acts not in a
regulatory capacity but as a commercial participant in a
given market. That is evident from... Union Pacific R.
Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941), which held
unlawful... certain rebates and concessions made by
Kansas City, Kansas, in its capacity as the owner and
operator of a wholesale produce market that was
integrated with railroad facilities. These sentences
should not be read to suggest the general proposition
that even governmental regulatory action may be
deemed private - and therefore subject to antitrust
liability - when it is taken pursuant to a conspiracy with
private parties. The impracticality of such a principle is
evident if, for purposes of the exception, "conspiracy"
means nothing more than an agreement to impose the
regulation in question. Since it is both inevitable and
desirable that public officials often agree to do what one
or another group of private citizens urges upon them,
such an exception would virtually swallow up the Parker
rule:
All anticompetitive regulation would be
vulnerable to a "conspiracy" charge. 36
The only realistic hope of voiding the state settlements on antitrust
grounds would lie in squeezing them into the "commercial participant"
exception. Clearly being an active conspirator is not enough. Although
the state is not a participant in the manufacturing of cigarettes, a court
might be willing to find that the state participated in the market by
claiming its share of the oligopoly profits. But as with the extraterritorial
taxation, substantial standing and jurisdictional barriers would need to

6 City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 374-75 (1991); see also E.
THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC

IMPLICATIONS § 3.07(A], at 90-103 (3d ed. 1998).
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be crossed before the substantive claim could be heard by a competent
tribunal.
IV. CONCLUSION

The individual state deals, in particular, represent a striking
regulatory innovation that threatens to externalize beyond the
consenting parties the majority of the deal's costs. If such shenanigans
are legal, they provide a blueprint for future mischief - a classic race-tothe-bottom. Unfortunately, no one has uncovered a silver bullet that
would be certain to kill the beast. The extraterritorial taxation effect
might violate the due process clause and the state's financial participation
in cartel profits might run afoul of the Sherman act, but it may be difficult
for out-of-state consumers to pursue these claims in federal court (not
subject to race-to-the-bottom pressure).
Simply because the state deals do not clearly violate current federal
law, however, does not mean that they could not be made to. Congress
should seriously consider prohibiting state settlements which condition
payments on future out-of-state sales - or at least require stronger
showings of out-of-state effects before allowing extraterritorial
regulation 37 - especially if such output-contingent damages are
combined with offsets (to split the cartel profits) or ancillary incentives to
curb new entry.
There is a substantial (but less likely than not) chance that the
current lawsuits by more than 30 cities, counties and states will be settled
with an industry-wide agreement that includes output-contingent
damages and producer offsets. Guns, like cigarettes, are a "pariah"
product which perversely makes strange bedfellows of the industry
shareholders and the far left. Both of these groups favor monopoly
pricing - the left because it reduces consumption, shareholders because it
by definition maximizes profits. Even fallacious suits against pariah
industries are therefore likely to be more politically feasible than suits
against other industries. 38

Unfortunately, the pathological lysine example was at least formally supported by
Alaska's claim of an environmental externality (acid rain). Alaska under such a
hypothetical federal statute would argue that payments conditioned on future lysine
production were rationally related to the amount of prospective damage that would rain
37

down.
m It is also interesting to note the parallel between Liggett and Smith & Wesson as the
early defectors in the industry's struggles against the state.
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Of course, there is great enmity and distrust between industry and
government officials - but this was surely the case with tobacco as well.
Anticompetitive reactions have become an explicit part of the response
to the Smith & Wesson's initial settlement. Six states are currently
investigating whether other industry participants have engaged in
concerted exclusionary behavior to punish Smith & Wesson.3 9 And gun
manufacturers have sued police enforcement agencies for conspiring to
purchase only from Smith & Wesson. 4° While the battlefield currently
turns on exclusionary strategies and counterstrategies, the disputants including the government plaintiffs - may all too soon see that there is
more money tobe made by colluding than by excluding.

-9 6 States in Antitnst Probe of Gun Makers, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Apr. 6, 2000.
40 David Lightman, Gun-makers Fight Back with Lawsuit, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 27,
2000, at A24.
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